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Executive Summary 
This project has investigated to what extent the size and shape of automatic stabilizers, 
in different European welfare regimes, results in different inequality outcomes between 
and within countries. The theoretical understandings are based in economics and 
Esping-Andersen’s theory of Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. The economic 
framework is imperative in comprehending automatic stabilizers and their function. 
Esping-Andersen’s theory has provided the comparative tools to examine and 
understand differences between welfare states. Namely, by examining the 
characteristics of different unemployment benefit systems, and their ability to reduce 
inequality. The quantitative data indicators that were measured stem chiefly from 
Eurostat and OECD. 
Several findings contradicted our assumptions. We found that the Netherlands and 
Denmark had characteristics similar to the social democratic welfare regime. Four 
countries had traits in common with the liberal welfare regime: Austria, Italy, UK and 
Ireland. Surprisingly, Ireland had the largest impact on inequality reduction due to 
social transfers, of all countries. Italy’s placement was unexpected as well, as it 
distanced itself considerably from the rest of the examined countries. Italy’s benefits 
were the most difficult to gain access to, and provided the lowest inequality reduction. 
The conservative welfare regime included: France, Sweden and Belgium. Sweden placed 
in this group despite the fact that it is traditionally assumed to belong to the social 
democratic regime. France fit the archetype of the conservative welfare regime, while 
Belgium’s social transfers reduce inequality to a greater extent. The size of the 
automatic stabilizers differed among the countries. Denmark had by far the largest with 
an almost 1:1 ratio between budget deterioration and unemployment rates. Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Ireland are all above the average of a 0.65 relation. The UK, Belgium 
and Italy are below the average, while France comes in last with a distinctly low 0,41 
relation.  
Overall, this project did not find a significant relation between the size of the automatic 
stabilizers and inequality. However, within the liberal regime the size of the automatic 
stabilizers have the least spread, whereas differences are larger for the social 
democratic and conservative welfare regimes. In contrast, the conservative welfare 
regime displayed quite a similar trend, only with regards to inequality reduction due to 
social transfers. The social democratic regime showed spread in both the size of 
automatic stabilizers and relative reduction in inequality. 
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“The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things 
equal.” 
 -Aristotle 
1.0 Introduction 
Few countries or sectors were left unscathed by the recent financial and economic crises, 
which sent shockwaves throughout countries across the world, resulting in mass 
unemployment and GDP contraction (Tridico, 2013: 175). But while European Union 
Member States were all hit hard by this common external shock (Dolls et al., 2012a: 1), 
the impacts of the recession on individual countries have been asymmetrical (EU 
Commission, 2009: 27). This inequality has manifested itself not only between Member 
States, where some countries have been able to recover more quickly than others, but 
within them as well, with discrepancies between social groups in terms of their economic 
vulnerability and exposure to unemployment.  
Troublingly, these asymmetrical outcomes are born out of the systemic differences 
between Member States and their persistence further drives more inequality, creating 
a vicious cycle. For example, countries that have experienced high levels of youth 
unemployment as a result of the crisis, are threatened by long-term productivity 
deterioration due to the loss of human capital across an entire generation (Scarpetta et 
al., 2010: 16). These differences in outcomes motivates a comparison of the 
administrative systems in place in different Member States which are triggered as a 
result of economic shock, to assess what roles they have (or have not) played in 
dampening the shock of the crisis. Learning about the institutions that make certain 
welfare regimes more resilient to external shocks can be useful in order to mitigate the 
extremity of future economic downturns. Additionally, it can be argued that the 
emergence of the crisis was a product of pre-existing inequality (Stockhammer, 2012: 
17) meaning that lessening inequality can in itself create stability and serve as a 
preventative measure. Failure to adapt and learn from the pains of the crisis will only 
perpetuate the vicious cycle of inequality.  
One important, but under researched (Blanchard, 2006 cited in Dolls et al., 2012b: 279) 
aspect playing a part here are the so-called automatic stabilizers. Underlying this 
concept are the different systems for administering taxation and social transfers, which 
stabilize the economy during up- and downswings. In theory, unemployment benefits in 
particular should play a key role in creating equality between and within countries. 
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Within countries, they should contribute to equality in terms of income distribution 
between people, ensuring that one is able to have a decent living despite unemployment. 
Between countries, at the macro level, unemployment benefits should drive 
consumption, keeping demand up during a recession thus avoiding a downward spiral 
of contraction. But these systems vary from country to country, thus motivating the 
measurement and comparison of the size and shapes of these automatic stabilizers 
across the EU. 
Additionally, within welfare state research, Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism provides a much used and criticized theoretical framework for comparative 
studies. Esping-Andersen’s theory provides a toolset for grouping countries into 
different ‘welfare regimes’, which will allow us to explore the nature of automatic 
stabilizers, to see if there are noticeable trends. In turn, this project seeks only to employ 
parts of Esping-Andersen’s framework which are relevant to the unemployment aspect 
of automatic stabilizers. By utilizing Esping-Andersen’s methods we aim to both 
compare a selection of European countries, and also explore and evaluate the strengths 
and shortcomings of the applied theoretical framework itself. This will allow us to test 
assumptions on the characteristics of the unemployment systems across these welfare 
regimes, raising the following problem definition and underlying research questions.  
 
1.1 Problem Definition 
To what extent did the size and shape of automatic stabilizers within different welfare 
regimes in the European Union result in differing outcomes in terms of inequality 
between and within countries? 
 
Research Question 1  
What factors determine the size of the automatic stabilizers in theory and what are their 
size in different countries? 
 
Research Question 2 
What are the theoretical relations between inequality in disposable income and the shape 
of the automatic stabilizers across different welfare regimes - can they be detected in 
reality? 
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Research Question 3 
How do the theoretical assumptions from different welfare regimes fare when compared 
to the empirical data? 
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“To study the welfare state is (...) a means to understand a novel 
phenomenon in the history of capitalist societies.”  
 -Gøsta Esping-Andersen 
2.0 Literature Review 
This chapter aims at exploring and discussing the academic field surrounding Esping-
Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, securing the theoretical foundation 
upon which this project is built. It will provide a critical introduction of Esping-
Andersen’s theory and the literature surrounding this work.  
 
2.1 Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
Gøsta Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990) stands as a seminal 
work in comparative welfare state studies, classified as “...arguably the most influential 
book” (Emmenegger et al., 2015: 10) in the discipline. While Esping-Andersen was 
preceded by the likes of Wilensky and Titmuss (Abrahamson, 1999: 395-398), it was 
Three Worlds that put comparative welfare state studies on the map (Ibid: 400). The 
purpose of this section is to review the literature surrounding this work in order to 
contextualize, criticize and finetune the understandings of the world that it provides, 
which will be unfolded further within the relevant theoretical chapter. 
  
2.1.1 Esping-Andersen’s Theory 
In short, Esping-Andersen provides an account of how historical-political developments 
have led to the emergence of three welfare regimes: liberal, conservative and social 
democratic (Emmenegger et al., 2015: 5). These welfare regimes have qualitatively 
different ideological understandings of the concepts of ‘decommodification’, and 
‘stratification’, which as a result has different implications for their respective societies 
in the economic, political, and social spheres (Ibid). This regime approach has proven 
useful for comparative analyses in order to classify and clarify empirical differences and 
similarities (Ebbinghaus, 2012: 2). However, work succeeding Esping-Andersen’s Three 
Worlds has both criticized and expanded upon its underlying concepts, indicators and 
categorizations. 
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2.1.2 Expanding the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
More recent analyses have attempted to categorize Central and Eastern European 
countries into the Three Worlds model. Esping-Andersen has discounted these 
additions, stating that the Central and Eastern European countries are merely in a 
state of transition (Esping-Andersen, 1996 cited in Fenger, 2007: 3). However, Fenger 
(2007) proposes that the Central and Eastern European countries continue to be distinct 
from the traditional welfare regimes, varying more from than the traditional European 
welfare states. As a result, Fenger brings forth three additional regimes: former-USSR 
(e.g. Latvia), post-communist European (e.g. Czech Republic), and developing welfare 
states (e.g. Romania). As a response to calls for more welfare regimes, Esping-Andersen 
stresses the risk of having as many regime types as there are cases (Esping-Andersen, 
1993 cited in Ebbinghaus, 2012: 5). But this raises the question of where to draw the 
line between the crispness of a simple three part model, versus something which 
actually resembles the real world, with warts and all? More radical criticisms question 
the regime concept altogether, as the neatly packaged underlying ideologies of the 
different regimes and countries are in actuality much more contradictory and disjointed 
due to the nature of policymaking itself (Kasza, 2002: 272-273). Namely, that 
advancements in welfare states have meant that different policy fields engage 
multitudes of different actors, meaning that it becomes increasingly difficult to have a 
unified policy vision or authority over policy making (Ibid: 277). One strategy to 
reconcile this is to focus comparative studies on one policy field, such as unemployment 
benefits, and examine it more deeply, to avoid “illegitimately personif[ying] entire 
nations or policy making establishments” (Ibid: 283).  
 
2.1.3 Feminist Criticism of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism  
The Three Worlds model has received criticism from feminist researchers as it “largely 
ignores women” (Lewis, 1997: 161). In regards to automatic stabilizers and 
unemployment in particular, this argument becomes interesting as the types of income 
transfers received may differ between genders; ‘first-class’ social insurance for men, and 
‘second-class’ social assistance for women, mirroring differences in access to paid or 
unpaid work (e.g. as a mother). Esping-Andersen does not take social assistance benefits 
into account, despite their importance for women, and differing level of generosity when 
comparing countries (Ibid: 164). This underlines a key shortcoming in using this sort of 
ideal type: there is a trade-off between understanding the ‘big picture’ and more detailed 
accounts of the actual content of individual social programs (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 2). 
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One proposed solution is that context matters, and regime typologies should be allowed 
to be altered depending on the policy area in question (Abrahamson, 1999: 412). As the 
policy area in focus for this research project is that concerning automatic stabilizers, 
this proposal to alter some regime definitions has been taken to heart, as will be 
explained in the respective theory and methods chapters. 
 
2.1.4 Criticism of Esping-Andersen’s Empirical Basis 
The empirical basis of Three Worlds has also been called into question. Esping-Andersen 
draws upon data from the late 1970s and 80s, focusing on measures based on passive 
policies such as a social security and pension spending (Powell & Barrientos, 2004: 87). 
But later follow-up welfare regimes analyses, based on newer data and incorporating 
different concepts and indicators, resemble the original Three Worlds models (Ibid: 100; 
Saint-Arnaud & Bernard, 2003: 522-523). On the other hand, some studies contradict 
Esping-Andersen’s findings entirely, showing miscategorization and more hybridity, 
meaning that countries may not fit so cleanly into the three models (Scruggs & Allan, 
2008: 663-664). Of note, the newer analyses that confirm Esping-Andersen’s findings 
show that the clustering of the models has become tighter since the 80s, indicating a 
path dependency and program reinforcement within the welfare regimes, rather than a 
move towards convergence into a singular regime. However, the confirmation of the 
regime models in follow-up studies could be a result of selection bias, due to the fact it 
is often more or less the same OECD countries that are being chosen (Ebbinghaus, 2012: 
6).  
 
2.1.5 Country Selection Bias 
Thus, a bias towards selecting certain countries has been proposed; although Esping-
Andersen’s analysis includes 18 OECD countries, the (at time new) southern EU 
countries, including Greece, Portugal and Spain were absent, not to mention the 
formerly communist Central and Eastern European countries (Ebbinghaus, 2012: 4-5). 
Some countries are highly consistent in their regime categorizations, e.g. Denmark as 
social democratic, the USA as liberal, Germany as conservative, but more hybrid 
countries such as the Netherlands and Finland have defied consistent categorization, 
highlighting the importance of indicators, time frame and case selection (Ibid: 6).  
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2.1.6 Criticism of Ideal Types 
Methodologically, the ideal types of Three Worlds have been criticized as well, with this 
form of welfare typology being compared to the intellectually stunted works of “bean-
counters and bookkeepers” (Abrahamson, 1999: 394). Further, this use of broad ideal 
types has been accused of hiding differences between countries within a particular 
welfare regimes; adherence may be more or less ‘fuzzy’ (Ebbinghaus, 2012: 10-11), such 
as the overall increase in dissimilarity between Nordic welfare states in the 90s (Kvist, 
1999: 251; Abrahamson, 1999: 411). But as a counterpoint, the typologizing of welfare 
regimes has been seen as especially important for EU studies, with regards to 
convergence and harmonization; if these countries have fundamental irreconcilable 
differences in their welfare states, finding a common agenda for employment policy may 
be extremely difficult (Ibid).  
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“In the long run we are all dead.” 
 -John Maynard Keynes 
3.0 Theory 
This section seeks to define the central theoretical framework which forms the 
foundation in this project. The framework is duo-sided, first presenting the thorough 
economical concepts which inform the project. Here we will explain automatic 
stabilizers, the inner workings behind them as well as defining key macro-economic 
differences which influence how we view the internal machinery behind the concepts. 
Afterwards, we introduce the framework of Esping-Andersen related to the Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism with special emphasis on the concepts of 
decommodification, stratification and welfare regimes. The main reason we employ this 
theory, is because it empowers our theoretical viewpoint with different indicators that 
can help us measure welfare states. It also provides us with a typology of three different 
welfare regimes and thus it enables us to compare and classify the investigated 
countries.  
 
3.1 Automatic Stabilizers 
3.1.1 Defining Automatic Stabilizers 
Automatic stabilizers are automatic, in the sense that they do not require any active 
fiscal policy on part of the government to initiate their purpose. This means that the 
policies controlling them are already in place, and will start automatically given the 
‘right’ conditions (Veld et al, 2012: 148). 
Automatic stabilizers are the policy instruments that become active during certain 
phases of business cycles, typically and also within the context of this project, we are 
talking about taxation and increases in unemployment benefits associated with a 
contraction in the business cycle, seen in Figure 1. However some researchers indicate 
that health and age related social expenditures are also important automatic 
stabilizers, but there is a dispute concerning to which extent this has an effect on the 
business cycle or whether it is cyclical at all (Veld, 2012: 147-150). In 2005, it was more 
than 80% of the federal budget in the United States that was considered uncontrollable, 
this is especially due to Medicare and unemployment costs (Peters, 2010: 232). Veld 
(2012) argues that size of government matters, because during upturns or downturns 
government will typically not change drastically in terms of government employees and 
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economic transfers, and hence it will have a soothing effect on business cycles (Veld et 
al, 2012: 147-150). 
The effect of automatic stabilizers is a cushioning of the fluctuations in real GDP. In 
expansions, they can dampen the economic activity if taxes are progressive, reducing 
the likelihood of an overheated economy. Overheating an economy can have several 
setbacks, chief amongst them inflation, which can in many cases lead to price increases 
that can undermine economic growth (Blanchard et al., 2013: 24-30). Under these 
circumstances, certain welfare systems will have dampening effects on the expansion of 
an economy. Conversely, and more relevant to this project, is the contraction aspect 
designed to alleviate pressures an economy can experience during a recession (Clement, 
1959: 559-560). Dependent on the welfare state in question, these mechanisms can be 
widely dissimilar, however in a European context a recurring topic is unemployment 
benefits as a part of welfare spending. 
 
3.1.2 Business Cycles and Crisis 
The aforementioned ‘right’ conditions are directly associated with what is termed the 
business cycles. A business cycle is based on GDP and the deviations that happen over 
time. As shown in Figure 1, a country will be expected to have contractions in their 
business cycles, i.e. lower economic activity and a decline in GDP growth, as well as 
expansions which are increases in GDP growth (Clement, 1959: 559-560). 
 
FIGURE 1 THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
To delve into the theoretical questions as to why do fluctuations occur in the first place, 
we need to look at the two differing economic paradigms: Monetarists and Post-
Source: Financial 
Planning Body of 
Knowledge, N.d 
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Keynesians. According to Monetarists, the fluctuations in economic output are in the 
long-run largely due to wrong monetary policy, most prominently the money supply. 
They argue that the best way to combat recessions is through monetary policy. A 
monetarist does not as such subscribe to the idea of business cycles. During recession, 
as opposed to a contraction period, monetarists insist on an increase in money supply. 
In short, this means making money cheaper, which will then spur growth, and 
conversely to limit the money supply during expansion to limit inflation (Blanchard et 
al., 2013: 543).  
On the other side of the fence, Post-Keynesians hold that the reason for fluctuations in 
the business cycle are because of market imperfections, therefore they are in favor of 
active fiscal policies, as well as stressing the importance of automatic stabilizers. This 
is the demand side approach, where they believe fiscal policy and demand are the main 
ingredients in controlling GDP output. Therefore, they argue government should 
intervene directly to adjust business cycle fluctuations (Blanchard et al., 2013: 543). 
Both theories are in agreement for the short-term, but for the medium- and long-term 
aspects there are bigger differences between the two. These theoretical differences will 
be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.1.3 Neoclassicism  
According to Neoclassical economists, the size of GDP in the long run depends on the 
factors of production and the production function. The factors of production and the 
production function are built on four basic assumptions (Jespersen, 2012: 1). 
1. Individual rational utility optimization 
2. Perfect knowledge of present and future prices 
3. Perfect competition 
4. Prices and wages are fully flexible  
Factors of production are the inputs used when producing goods and services. The most 
important factors of production are labor and capital. Labor is comprised of the hours 
worked and capital consists of the tools and machines used to produce the goods 
(Mankiw, 2000: 44). The production function describes the relationship between the 
output generated and the amount of labor and capital put in. Functions of production 
can be different between countries and between firms, this is largely due to differences 
in technology. This means that in its most basic form the Neoclassical theory argues 
that since the generated output is determined by the production function and the factors 
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of production, it is the supply of labor and capital, which determine the size of GDP in 
the long run. 
 
3.1.4 Post-Keynesianism      
Post-Keynesian economics is based on a non-equilibrium, non-market clearing 
assumption and change over time. The driving force of the economy is effective demand, 
especially investment. Where Neoclassical economists assume that the labor market 
starts in equilibrium and that it is the supply of labor and capital that determines the 
size of the output, the Post-Keynesian economists argues that it is effective demand that 
determines the size of an economy’s output (Arestis, 1972: 112). 
Government is an important institution in Post-Keynesian theory. Government has the 
ability to enact contra-cyclical policies. Another important institution is large 
corporations. They are not subject to perfect competition and thus have some market 
power, they are price-setters and quantity-takers. Firms are limited in their price 
setting by four factors: 
1. Substitution: will the consumers switch to another product? 
2. Will the new price create a room in market for a new competitor? 
3. Government intervention, taxes, price control, etc. 
4. The power of trade unions: How much of the increased profit from the price spike 
will the firm have to share with its employees, because of strong trade unions? 
(Arestis, 1972: 119).  
 
3.1.5 Medium-run Disputes 
According to Neoclassical economists, wages in the medium term are decided either by 
firms or as a result of bargaining between workers and firms. Wages follow the 
unemployment rate; if it goes up, then wages go down. If unemployment goes down, 
wages go up. Wage levels are also affected by expected price levels. If prices are expected 
to go up workers will push for wage compensation for the higher prices, if the prices are 
expected to fall, workers might want to accept a lower wage than they otherwise would 
have (Blanchard et al., 2013: 128). In the medium run, output returns to the natural 
level of output, which is determined by equilibrium in the labor market (Ibid: 156). 
A Post-Keynesian economist will agree that wage levels are affected by the 
unemployment rate and inflation, but it is not a one to one relationship, because the 
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market has imperfections. Post-Keynesians emphasize the role of institutions in the 
economy. This means that the strength of labor unions and employers also becomes 
important when deciding the wage levels, not just the unemployment and inflation 
levels (Arestis, 1972: 119).  
When we consider the medium-term effect of the automatic stabilizers, in the 
Neoclassical theory, we find that the automatic stabilizers do not have a positive effect 
on GDP. This is because, as described above, the automatic stabilizers keep the 
employment level up during a crisis and therefore wages will not fall as much as they 
would have done otherwise. This causes inflation, and thus higher wages. This lowers 
the competitiveness of firms and thus decreases exports. The automatic stabilizers also 
cause a deficit on the public budget during a recession, and this deficit will have to be 
financed. The financing will come from available investment capital, which means that 
the amount of capital available to investors will be lower, thus lowering the levels of 
investments in new capital. The size of the automatic stabilizers are also important 
here. The larger the size, the larger the natural rate of unemployment. This is because 
the market value of people's work are not the same. Some people have specialized skills, 
which can greatly increase the profit rate for investors, thus they are paid a high wage. 
Other people have no or little education or skills. Thus their ability to make profit for 
investors are much lower. This means that in some cases their productivity is so low, 
that it is not profitable for businesses to employ them at a wage, above the level of social 
assistance or unemployment benefits. The unemployed are assumed not to be willing to 
accept a job with a wage below the level of their current benefits. 
In the Post-Keynesian theory, wages would be affected by the automatic stabilizers, but 
there will still be an advantage to having automatic stabilizers of a considerable size. 
This is because, as mentioned above, Neoclassical theory assumes that minimum wage 
levels would drop to a level where everyone who wants to find a job can find a job, 
because the value of their labor is higher than their wage. This is not the case in Post-
Keynesian theory. Here the power relations between labor unions and employers play a 
part. Strong unions are able to keep wages from falling as much as in the Neoclassical 
theory. This means that the loss of competitiveness, due to the automatic stabilizers, 
are smaller and thus the impact on export is smaller. At the same time the positive 
effects of the automatic stabilizers are still in effect, keeping demand up and preventing 
the economy from going into very deep recessions. 
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3.1.6 Long-run Disputes 
The production function and factors of production are what determines output in the 
Neoclassical theory. This means that in the long-run the economic output of an economy 
is determined by supply of labor and capital. According to Neoclassical theory, 
automatic stabilizers will in the long-run dampen the speed with which the economy 
grows. The negative effects on investments will only become larger in the long-run, 
guided by the same economic mechanisms as described in the medium-run. The negative 
effects on the natural rate of unemployment will persist as well. 
Post-Keynesian economists would argue that it does not make sense to extrapolate an 
economic model 30 or 50 years into future. This is because the concept of uncertainty is 
much more prominent within the Post-Keynesian theory. Post-Keynesianism challenges 
the Neoclassical assumption of perfect knowledge of present and future prices. Instead 
Post-Keynesians believe that the future is unknown and uncertain for agents (Arestis, 
1972: 113). They also challenge the assumption of rational utility optimization because 
they recognize that individual behavior is influenced by social conventions and 
institutions (Ibid.: 112). It stresses that agents handle the lack of certainty in market 
by developing institutions, such as supply agreements, wage contracts and trading 
agreements. Institutional structures can however change or break down, this is what is 
causing economic crises. This means that the economic system does not balance itself, 
it is instead a “cumulatively unfolding process” (Ibid.: 114). 
 
3.1.7 Efficacy of Automatic Stabilizers 
Efficacy of automatic stabilizers is a somewhat disputed area of research, and has 
proven difficult to establish. There are even examples of automatic stabilizers 
functioning as ‘destabilizers’ which in effect means that the intended outcome is 
completely the opposite of what is desired. Clement (1959) underlines the importance of 
automatic stabilizers, but during larger imbalances, he calls for active fiscal policy for 
adjustment. This point is somewhat negated by Veld, et al. (2012) as they point out that 
the time delay between discretionary fiscal policy and its implementation might render 
it useless. Furthermore, Veld, et al. argues that there is a general disagreement among 
researchers as to what effect automatic stabilizers have (Veld et al., 2012: 147-149). 
Eilbott (1966) finds that automatic stabilizers are very effective at stopping 
countercyclical movements of the business cycles in the US, and notes that it would be 
more successful given larger benefit payments (Eilbott, 1966: 463-464). 
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3.2 Esping Andersen’s Concepts Relating to Automatic Stabilizers 
As outlined in the literature review, context matters for welfare regime studies 
(Abrahamson, 1999: 412). With this in mind, portions of Esping-Andersen’s theory have 
been selected due to their relevance for this research project. Namely, the concepts of 
decommodification and stratification, which will be explained in this section. 
Furthermore, Esping-Andersen’s three ideal type welfare regimes will be briefly 
described, including interpretations of their composition in terms of the previously 
mentioned concepts, and automatic stabilizers. 
 
3.2.1 Decommodification 
In order to begin this conceptualization it is imperative to touch upon ‘commodification’ 
as it both historically proceeds from and serves as a ballast to ‘decommodification’. 
Commodification springs from the onset of capitalism, where a person's ability to 
survive and meet needs transformed from being provided by the family, church or ruler, 
to their participation in the labor force (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 35). Commodification 
is thus dual-pronged, reflecting the ability of individuals to satisfy basic needs through 
the purchasing of commodities, as well as the Marxian notion where labor power itself 
becomes a commodity. A core problem raised by the development of commodification is 
that one's ability to meet fundamental needs becomes threatened if they are not able to 
participate in the labor market (Ibid). With commodification, external factors outside of 
the individual's control can challenge their capacity to survive (Ibid: 37). Individuals 
can lose their labor power due to illness, or more macro-level shocks, such as the recent 
economic crisis, which alter the entire structure of the labor market. 
Decommodification thus implies the degree to which different welfare regimes allow 
individuals to meet their basic needs despite a lack in labor market participation. 
Differences in regimes are expressed in terms of the strength, scope and quality of social 
policies which allow for decommodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). Comparative 
public administration plays a role in analyzing these differences, where the degree of 
decommodification can be empirically identified across time and between nations (Ibid: 
47). There are three dimensions which can be compared in order to operationalize the 
concept: 1) ease of access to, and duration of, benefits; 2) the replacement rate of income; 
3) the range of entitlement rights available (Ibid). Our approach to operationalizing 
decommodification will be explained in more detail in the analytic strategy. 
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3.2.2 Stratification 
Although welfare states provide income security through decommodification, they also 
serve as systems of social ordering, which can vary between maintaining class divisions 
or providing social solidarity (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 55). More precisely, welfare 
states not only correct inequalities but they can also structure social differentiation 
through the punishment or stigmatization of benefit recipients (Ibid: 21-22). 
Two main theoretical lines dominate in this conceptualization. Neo-Marxists argue that 
the welfare state serves as a tool of the state to maintain the status quo, providing just 
enough poor relief to maintain social stability. The counter-argument presented by T.H. 
Marshall, amongst others, is that the welfare state is empowering, dampening the 
causations of cross-class tensions and democratizing access to the state (Ibid: 55). We 
do not intend to provide grand-level claims on the nature of the welfare state, but rather 
to compare countries in terms of their ability to reduce stratification via the social 
transfer aspect of automatic stabilizers. 
The primary method for operationalizing stratification in comparative welfare state 
studies has been to focus on the equality of income distribution, not in terms of overall 
developments, but rather the relation between the organization of automatic stabilizers 
in different welfare states, and equality (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 56). Namely, 
comparatively analyzing the impact of the interplay between taxation and expenditure, 
on the equality of income distribution. This approach is quite complementary to 
investigating the primary object of inquiry in this research project, in that the two parts 
of the aforementioned interplay are key aspects of the size and shape of automatic 
stabilizers. However, Esping-Andersen argues that social transfers have come to replace 
taxation as the primary means for distribution across welfare states (Ibid). This is due 
to the heavy financial requirements of welfare states which require heavy taxation, even 
on low-income households (Ibid). As a result, the system of social transfers comes to 
have the largest net impact on redistribution. Thus, when investigating Esping-
Andersen’s concepts, the focus will be on the role of social transfers rather than taxation. 
However, Esping-Andersen urges a look beyond mere aggregate income distribution for 
other indicators of stratification (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 57). One method is to focus on 
the micro-level at the income distribution within specific groups who are particularly 
dependent on transfers, such as families with children and the elderly. Going beyond 
income distribution, it is possible to study how the welfare state shapes outcomes in 
class and status. For example, by examining how education systems enable or constrain 
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individuals’ propensity to become socially mobile. But for this research project, the focus 
on automatic stabilizers motivates a scope delimited to income distribution. 
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that countries with similar levels of income equality 
could have different underlying social structures, warranting deeper investigation (Ibid: 
58). The operationalization of the income distribution aspect of automatic stabilizers 
will be explained further in the analytic strategy. 
 
3.2.3 Welfare Regimes 
Esping-Andersen provides three ideal types to describe different clusters of welfare 
states: liberal, social democratic and conservative. Liberal welfare states are 
characterized by a minimization of decommodification mechanisms, with a stratification 
divided between the relative poverty of those who are reliant on transfers, and market-
differentiated welfare amongst the majority of the population (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 
27). The state is mostly limited to intervening to reduce poverty, providing minimal 
transfers mostly on a means-tested basis. Related to automatic stabilizers, it can be 
extracted that they will be the lowest due to the fact that benefits are targeted primarily 
towards low income workers. 
The social democratic regime is based on universalism with programs of high 
decommodification extended to all citizens, not only the poorest (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 27-28). Equality is highly promoted in these regimes, with an emphasis on 
reconciling the stratification between the working and middle classes (Ibid: 27). In 
terms of automatic stabilizers, it can be interpreted that they would be both large and 
costly, as they cover society indiscriminately and seek to have a high redistributive 
impact.  
The conservative welfare regime is in between the other models in terms of 
decommodification, having less of a market focus than the liberal regime, but 
stratification is quite high as rights are attached to class and social group status 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990: 27).  Hence, the size of the automatic stabilizers should be 
higher than in liberal states, but their effect on reducing inequality should be lowest as 
the state has an emphasis on upholding status differences (Ibid).  
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“By three methods we may learn wisdom: First, by reflection, which 
is noblest; second, by imitation, which is easiest; and third by 
experience, which is the bitterest.” 
- Confucius 
4.0 Methods 
In this section, we will introduce the methods used in this project which is anchored in 
a quantitative approach. Firstly, we will present the quantitative framework as the 
foundation in this project. Second, we will highlight the essential comparative elements 
and the implications they have. Thirdly, the analytical strategy will outline the exact 
approach used to study the data. It will also highlight the three main parts of the 
quantitative analysis, they are the following:  
 The relationship between unemployment and the size of automatic stabilizers. 
 The impact of social transfers on Gini-coefficients. 
 The decommodification analysis of EU welfare states.  
Penultimately, concerns regarding the project's data, validity and reliability will be 
discussed. Finally our choice of countries will be accounted for. 
 
4.1 Quantitative Methods 
The project’s central approach is quantitative methods. The main approach to our data 
is to first get an impression of what the real world looks like, therefore we are not 
working in a specific deductive approach. We are neither working in strictly inductive 
approach, in which the data is observed and afterwards the methodological 
considerations are made. This somewhat middle ground is named by Bryman (2012) as 
analytical induction. The main feature and strength of this approach is to have a rough 
research question which then is subject to change during the analytical phases of the 
project. Furthermore, the design of the project as well as the research questions can 
then be honed to best analyze the data as well as allowing us to reflect on the data and 
the methodological framework during the process (Bryman, 2012: 566-567). 
On the surface, the main difference between quantitative and qualitative research 
designs are measurements, or quantification (Bryman, 2012: 35-37). Broadly speaking, 
the advantages of a quantitative approach in this project are vast, as it enables us to do 
a cross-country comparison among many countries. Although it is possible to examine 
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similar phenomena within the realm of qualitative methods as well, it is not within the 
scope of a semester project.  
Essential to quantitative analysis are measurements, they enable us to identify 
differences among parameters, provide a consistent framework for making these 
distinctions across time and researchers and finally, it provides the possibility to 
investigate the relation between parameters (Bryman, 2012: 164). The comparative 
aspect of this project is all-permeating, since we focus on many EU member states, as 
mentioned above, proper measurements allow us to compare across countries.  Bryman 
underlines the strength of comparative designs to contrast cases and uncover relations 
(Ibid: 710). 
There are several comparative characteristics in the approach we have chosen, the three 
main investigations are all comparative in nature. The time frame varies slightly, from 
8 years for the Eurostat data to 15 years for the OECD data. By introducing temporal 
elements, we increase the validity of our findings. Furthermore, temporal approaches 
can also benefit in explaining changes, not only amongst countries but also within. 
 
4.2 Analytical Strategy for Empirical Data 
This section explains the strategy for answering our research questions (RQ). As a key 
part of the research questions is the interplay between theory and reality, portions of 
the research questions have already been laid out in the theoretical chapter. Thus the 
strategy for investigating the empirical data, which were compared against the 
theoretical underpinnings, will be uncovered here. Table 1 gives an overview of how 
each research question will be explored, in terms of data, concepts and indicators, as 
well as process undertaken. 
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 Data Main concepts and 
underlying indicators 
Process 
RQ1:  What factors 
determine the size of the 
automatic stabilizers in 
theory and what are 
their size in different 
countries? 
OECD Automatic stabilizers  
 General government 
financial balance 
 General government 
cyclically-adjusted 
balance 
 Harmonized 
Unemployment rate 
Outline determining factors 
in theory chapter.  
 
Measure size of AS in 
different countries 
empirically. 
RQ2:  What are the 
theoretical relations 
between inequality 
(disposable income) and 
the shape of the 
automatic stabilizers 
across different welfare 
regimes - can they be 
detected in reality? 
 Eurostat 
 First- and 
third-party 
websites on 
unemployment 
benefits in 
different 
countries 
 Scruggs & 
Allan 2003 
Decommodification  
 Replacement rate of 
unemployment 
benefits 
 Unemployment benefit 
duration 
 Waiting days for 
unemployment benefit 
 Working duration 
needed for benefits 
 Coverage of workers 
Stratification 
 Gini-coefficient before 
and after social 
transfers 
Outline relation between 
inequality and AS in different 
welfare regimes in theory 
chapter. 
 
Measure and compare 
decommodification indices 
across countries.   
 
Measure impact of transfers 
on social transfers on 
inequality and compare 
across countries. 
 
RQ3: How do the 
theoretical assumptions 
from different welfare 
regimes fare when 
compared to the 
empirical data? 
 
Results from RQ 1 & 2 Welfare Regimes 
 Stratification 
 Decommodification 
Automatic Stabilizers 
Group countries according to 
adherence to different welfare 
regime based on results from 
RQ 2. 
Examine the difference 
between theory and results. 
TABLE 1 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
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This section also explains exactly how we made the calculations in Microsoft Excel, with 
the abovementioned parameters. First, we calculate the cost of unemployment and do a 
statistical test. Second, we apply the decommodification analysis, where we investigate 
the different parameters of the countries in order to use Esping-Andersen’s ranking 
system. Then we look into the Gini-coefficients and social transfers across countries to 
gain further insight into stratification. We score the countries by testing if their system 
is significantly different from systems in the other countries. We then group the 
countries in the three welfare state regimes based on stratification and 
decommodification scores, and compare the size of automatic stabilizers.  
 
4.2.1 Determining the Size of Automatic Stabilizers 
First we collected the following indicators: General Government Financial Balances and 
General Government Cyclically-Adjusted Balances in a single Excel sheet. Our second 
step was to find the difference between the actual public budget balance and public 
budget at structural balance across the different countries. This gives us an indication 
of unemployment costs in the examined time frame. 
Now that we have the numbers for the cost of unemployment, we must account for the 
different levels of unemployment across the countries in the time period. To calculate 
this relation we use the LINEST function in Excel to determine the best fit for a straight 
line between Harmonized Unemployment rate (HUR) and the cost of unemployment. 
This relation is statistical in nature, and we therefore test whether or not the relation 
is statistically significant, which means that it must have a p-value below -2 or above 2. 
The simple equation for a line formula is:  
y= mx + b 
=LINEST(known y’s, known x’s;1;1) 
Then by plotting in the known y’s (the cost of unemployment), and known x’s (HUR) we 
get the relation between the two parameters. Here beta, or the slope of the curve, tells 
us that if there is an increase in unemployment by 1%, then the budget deteriorates by 
the beta amount. This means that the steeper the decline in the slope, the higher the 
cost is of unemployment in that particular country, and this is the size of the automatic 
stabilizers. Conversely, if there is a decrease in unemployment we can see how much 
the budget improves. The intersect b, tells us what the budget balance would look like 
if unemployment is at zero percent, hypothetically. 
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R-square tells us how much of the variation in the data can be explained by actual 
values compared to estimated values. Therefore, the higher the R-square, the more the 
relation can be explained by the two parameters that we have used. A low relation 
indicates that there might be other variables better suited at explaining the variation 
in the data (Microsoft Office, n.d.). 
Before using any of the abovementioned results, we have tested the significance of each 
individual country. To calculate the significance, we have divided beta with the 
standard error. No observations that do not satisfy the below -2 or above 2 in p-value 
rule of thumb have been included in the actual analysis. 
 
4.2.2 The Relation between Automatic Stabilizers and Inequality 
Expanding upon the calculation of the size of automatic stabilizers in the different 
countries as outlined above, we investigated unemployment benefits using Esping-
Andersen’s concepts of commodification and stratification in order to rank them 
comparatively. These concepts have been isolated due to their relevance for the policy 
area at hand, as justified in the literature review (Abrahamson, 1999: 412). This allowed 
us to position the investigated countries in terms of their welfare state models, and gave 
further insight into the shape of their automatic stabilizers.  
In order to investigate the decommodifying capacity of transfers across countries, 
Esping-Andersen’s own methods related to unemployment benefits were applied. As 
outlined in the theory, the following indicators were used to rank the countries and 
develop a decommodification index: average net replacement rates, number of weeks of 
prior employment necessary for qualification, waiting days for payout of benefits, and 
duration of benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54). For each of these indicators, the 
standard deviation from the mean was calculated based on the results in each country. 
The standard deviation allowed us to group the countries for each indicator, with 
countries receiving a score based on whether if they fell above, below or within the 
standard deviation from the mean. This was calculated using the following formula: 
 Standard Deviation:  
Meaning, for each indicator, we first found the mean across countries. Then for each 
country, we subtracted the mean, and squared the result. For the weeks of work and 
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duration indicators we removed extreme outliers, Netherlands and Ireland respectively, 
as they skewed the mean and concealed the differences between the other countries. 
This removal of outliers follows Esping-Andersen’s own approach, as their inclusion 
hides the differences between non-outliers. We then found the mean for these squared 
results. Finally, we took the square root of this mean, giving us the standard deviation.   
Adding and subtracting the standard deviation from the mean for each indicator gave 
us a range of values (SD- 1 to SD+1) which could be used to group the countries and 
assign them a score from 1 to 3. Countries with a value less than SD - 1 would receive 
a score of 1, countries with a value greater than SD + 1 would receive a score of 3, and 
everything falling between would receive a score of 2. Following Esping-Andersen’s 
methods, the replacement rate indicator scores were doubled as this a crucial part of 
decommodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 54). Adding together all of these scores for 
each indicator across each country gave us a decommodification index, which was then 
weighted by multiplying the percentage of the population who have access to 
unemployment benefits in each country.  
Esping-Andersen’s own stratification scoring procedure is linked to investigating 
healthcare, payment of civil servants, and pensions systems (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 
77), but as these aspects are not so relevant to automatic stabilizers the focus was kept 
to transfers. More precisely, the impact of transfers on income distribution. This limits 
the applicability of Esping-Andersen’s own method for scoring countries in terms of 
stratification, so instead we developed our own method. 
In order to investigate the relation between transfers and stratification we used the 
Gini-coefficient. First we calculated the difference between Gini-coefficient before and 
after social transfers, in each country. However, it was necessary to clean up the data 
from Eurostat, in order to pinpoint the particular impact of transfers. Within the social 
transfers indicator in the data, pensions are included, amongst other non-employment 
related benefits such as sickness and housing allowances. As reaching retirement age 
cannot be seen as a shock which would be counteracted by automatic stabilizers or 
triggered by a recession, it was necessary to remove pensions from the data. This was 
accomplished by finding the difference between two Gini-coefficients: Gini before 
transfers but including pensions, subtracted from Gini before transfers but excluding 
pensions. This isolated the influence of pensions on Gini, which was then added to the 
data on Gini after all transfers to remove their impact, giving us comparable figures 
which could show the influence of transfers alone. However, the inclusion of sickness 
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and housing allowances provides some noise but it was not possible to clean these out, 
as we did with pensions. 
Then, averages for both figures were calculated between the period of 2005-2013, 
covering years before, during and after the crisis. Using these values, the impact of 
transfers on inequality was calculated by finding the total relative change in Gini before 
transfers (x) and Gini after transfers (y), with pensions removed as explained above. 
Relative change was chosen over absolute change to take into account the fact that the 
countries have different starting positions in terms of their Gini level, which would be 
obfuscated by looking at absolute change alone. 
Total relative change is given by the equation: 
Total relative change = 100 * (y/x – 1) 
This gives a comparable indication of how large a redistributive role social transfers 
play in relation to inequality across the investigated countries. Finally, this value was 
used to establish a stratification score for the different countries, using a method similar 
to that employed in establishing the decommodification index. However, only one 
indicator was used, making the stratification index less nuanced. Furthermore, Italy’s 
far outlying low score meant that it was delimited from the calculation of the standard 
deviation. 
 
4.2.3 Investigating the Role of Automatic Stabilizers in Different Welfare Regimes 
The final part of the analysis takes the form of a discussion. First we combined our 
findings from the first two research questions, in order to categorize the investigated 
countries within the welfare regime ideal types. We used this to discuss the relationship 
between decommodification and unemployment in a macroeconomic perspective. 
Several factors were found that added uncertainty to our results, which will also be 
discussed. 
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4.3 Data 
This project employs a multitude of data sources, yet the two most prevalently used 
sources are Eurostat and OECD. Whenever possible, the chosen time frame is 1997 - 
2014. The reasoning behind this timeframe, is both due to restrictions with the chosen 
databases and to envelop both the crises and the pre-crises. 
One of the digital resources for the project is OECD. The reason for choosing OECD is 
that they present the variable named ‘General Government Cyclically-Adjusted 
Balances’, which shows what the budget balance would be if output is at the potential 
level, i.e. the balance between revenue and expenditure if the economy would be in an 
optimal position (OECD, 2011).  This variable is not available at Eurostat and it is vital 
to the calculations in this project, therefore we have chosen to exclusively use data from 
OECD in order to ensure comparability with regards to this part of the calculations.  
General Government Financial Balances is much like the abovementioned variable, but 
this variable is not controlled for the potential output. Hence, this variable is 
government revenue and expenditure and will therefore be either in surplus or deficit, 
depending on which is larger (OECD, 2011). 
Harmonized Unemployment Rate is a straightforward parameter, the unemployment 
rate is the percentage of the labor force not in work. The harmonized part, means that 
the unemployment rate is controlled for national differences in measurement and 
therefore it is suitable for comparison across countries.  
In terms of the Gini Index data used to operationalize stratification, we use both the 
before transfers (including and excluding pensions) and after transfers Gini indices from 
the Eurostat database. The Gini index measures the variation in income, the closer to 
0, the more equal the distribution is, and the closer to 1 the more unequal. In the case 
of the Gini-coefficients we have used Eurostat, since the data range was higher thus 
enabling a more thorough analysis.  
Data on the unemployment benefit systems used to operationalize decommodification 
were gathered from a variety of sources. To gain the most recent information on benefit 
duration, waiting days, and ease of access, official government websites containing 
unemployment information were used (Borger.dk, 2015; Citizens Information, 2015; 
Citizens Advice, 2015; I Amsterdam, 2015; Public Employment Service Austria, 2015). 
In some countries, this information was not available from official sources in English, 
necessitating the use of third-party resources targeted at workers travelling within the 
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EU (Nordic Social Insurance Portal, 2015; Just Landed, n.d; Cleiss, 2015), and OECD 
reports (OECD, n.d.; OECD, 2009). Data on net unemployment replacement rates were 
derived from an OECD report which provided average rates for 2013 (OECD, 2013). 
Averages were chosen over specific types of workers, e.g. single workers with no children 
making 100% the average wage, in order to cover the entire spectrum of the benefits 
which vary considerably based on income and family status across countries. Finally, 
the data used to represent the number of workers covered by unemployment benefits 
was derived from the values used by Scruggs & Allan (2003). This is a notable limitation 
as these values are from 2000. But it was necessary as newer data could not be located 
in the databases available to us, nor manually reconstructed due to a lack of necessary 
information on a country by country basis, which would have significantly reduced the 
amount of countries available for comparison.  
 
4.4 Validity and Reliability 
Validity in terms of quantitative research revolves around whether an indicator really 
measures what it is meant to measure (Bryman, 2012: 171).  
There are several validity concerns in our project, yet being aware of the limitations of 
an indicator is imperative in deducing any knowledge from them. One specific issue is 
that within our calculation of the automatic stabilizers, we indirectly utilize OECD’s 
methodology which means that we rely on their implicit worldview. At first sight, this 
might not seem to be an important issue, since the rest of the data is also from the same 
source, however the way in which this variable is calculated includes an estimation of 
the output gap. This output gap is based on economic models and therefore also includes 
assumptions about the real world. According to Morgan (2012), models are a 
representation of real life, but it is not real life. Although this is a quite self-evident 
observation it has serious repercussions if not scrutinized properly. As the models 
themselves are only representations of real life, it also means that the creator of the 
model posits several assumptions about the workings of the economy into her model, 
and that these assumptions are very important for evidence that the model will provide. 
In other words, it might be theories, speculation, ideas or an amalgamation of all that 
which are represented in the model. This is why Morgan named her book The World in 
the Model, to distinguish between reality and the representative reality and perhaps 
more importantly that researchers are not always aware of the difference between the 
two (Morgan, 2012: 30-36). 
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Morgan denotes what she calls narratives, as the story that economists use often from 
hypothetical situations in which they envision their model to be used. In this way the 
narrative becomes epistemic to the model, it decides how knowledge is being obtained 
not only by the question that it poses but also by its narrative features. This narrative 
link can also be understood cognitively, the demonstration of the model to the more 
concrete events, and how to understand these linkages. Therefore it becomes a cognitive 
approach by economists to fit their model with the real world, it configures the world 
for the theoretical backbone (Morgan, 2012: 239).  
One of the main indicators used in this project is the Gini-coefficient, and it is not 
without its shortcomings. We will here briefly critically discuss the Gini-coefficient and 
some of the related issues and one very specific issue related to our project. The Gini-
coefficient is a representation of income inequality, yet the same Gini number can be an 
expression for different wealth levels, which quite rightly leaves an ambiguous 
impression of the numerical value. Also, because the Gini-coefficient is a relative 
measure, it is plausible that a decrease in the absolute poorest in a country might 
actually be seen as an increase in the Gini-coefficient (World Bank, 2015). The specific 
concern for the method we use in calculating Gini, is that it was not possible to filter 
taxation apart from the results. This means that both of the calculated parameters, 
social transfers, unemployment benefits and pensions, have a hidden influence of 
taxation’s effect on the relative change in Gini-coefficients. According to Esping-
Andersen this is not an important aspect, since taxation regimes are generally so large 
that most citizens are taxed heavily, therefore the tax itself does not play a large role 
but rather the important factor is social transfers (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 56). Lastly, 
the Gini-coefficient does not take into account wealth. Piketty (2014) denotes that the 
Gini-coefficient is a synthetic index, and that it does implicitly cover capital and 
therefore wealth distributions (Piketty, 2014: 263-270). It is possible to use Gini-
coefficients in terms of capital ownership, but this is outside of the scope of this project. 
The aspect of wealth is not a part of project as such, but the critique is still relevant and 
covers the limitations of the Gini-coefficient as a concept and its limits as an indicator. 
Reliability in quantitative research is strongly connected with replicability, and 
answers the question whether the observations in this project can be recreated with the 
same methodological framework (Bryman, 2012: 168-170). Trying to accommodate 
replicability, we have detailed the exact approach used in this project as well as using 
well-regarded sources in our calculations, mainly OECD and Eurostat. However, lack 
of sources in OECD have necessitated us to use data from both Eurostat and OECD in 
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our calculations. We do not view this as a shortcoming, as data from both sources are 
official and well-regarded. Comparative research can be subject to certain reliability 
issues, one of which is the changing national definitions of parameters which can make 
comparison difficult at best. If possible, we have used harmonized variables to the extent 
they are available. Yet this remains a legitimate concern implicit to most comparative 
methods.   
 
4.5 Delimitation and Choice of Countries 
We aim to investigate the countries in the EU, however by choosing to use OECD data 
there are several countries that we do not include simply because OECD does not have 
the data on these countries in the parameters that we have chosen. This lead to the 
exclusion of the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovakia and Romania. Additionally, the choice of countries was further 
delimited when calculating the correlation between automatic stabilizers and 
unemployment within the initial stage of the analysis. Here, the t-test indicated that 
there was an insignificant relationship between the variables, leading to the further 
exclusion of a few more countries: Finland, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland 
and Slovenia. Finally, a considerable constraint for the decommodification investigation 
was the lack of data on the percentage of workers covered by unemployment benefits. 
As the data from Scruggs & Allan (2003) did not have values from all countries, it lead 
to further narrowing down of: Greece, Estonia, Czech Republic, Spain and Portugal. The 
final choice of countries thus included: Ireland, Denmark, France, Italy, Austria, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
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“Realists do not fear the results of their study.” 
 - Fyodor Dostoevsky 
5.0 Results 
This chapter aims to present all the results generated by our empirical research. This 
chapter is divided into three categories, presenting the data from the three main 
indicators used in this project. 
These indicators are:  
 Automatic Stabilizers 
 Stratification 
 Decommodification 
 
5.1 Automatic Stabilizers 
This subchapter aims to present the results from the analysis, and in doing so, answer 
the research question posted below.  
 
RQ1:  What factors determine the size of the automatic stabilizers in theory and what 
are their size in different countries? 
 
5.1.1 Automatic Stabilizers in Theory 
The automatic stabilizers are the non-discretionary policies that come into play, 
especially when the economy goes into a downturn or a crisis. In most modern welfare 
states across the world, the main components of automatic stabilizers consist of 
unemployment benefits and social assistance. The size of the automatic stabilizers is 
not only reliant on the particular level of unemployment benefits and social assistance, 
but also determined by fluctuations in business cycles. By looking at a longer time 
frame, 18 years, the fluctuations in the business cycles should be of relatively low 
impact. However, it is unlikely that the financial crisis has been filtered through, as a 
result of the sheer size and impact of the crisis on unemployment and public deficits. 
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5.1.2 Size of Automatic Stabilizers 
Table 2 depicts the size of the automatic stabilizers and has been rounded to two 
decimals. Therefore Denmark has 1 whereas the true number is closer to 0,9968 and 
this goes for the other countries as well. The average is at 0,65 and it is used in order to 
illustrate how much some of the countries deviate from the average.  
 
 AS -slope Intercept Rsq Significance 
Denmark -1,00 5,96 0,91 -12,59 
Netherlands -0,76 3,94 0,88 -10,82 
Austria -0,71 3,50 0,34 -2,89 
Ireland -0,67 6,02 0,95 -17,05 
Sweden -0,66 4,60 0,47 -3,75 
United Kingdom -0,62 3,70 0,73 -6,65 
Belgium -0,55 4,45 0,43 -3,46 
Italy -0,49 4,35 0,37 -3,04 
France -0,41 4,02 0,44 -3,56 
Average -0,65 - - - 
TABLE 2 SIZE OF AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS 
 
 
FIGURE 2 SIZE OF THE AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS 
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We can see in Figure 2 that the largest impact on the public budget is clearly in 
Denmark, it is very close to a 1:1 ratio and therefore the automatic stabilizers play a 
large role in Danish economy. Surprisingly, Sweden has a quite low position compared 
to Denmark. These countries are often assumed to be part of the social democratic 
regime, yet this set of data seems to indicate that there is further between them and 
perhaps not so much in common as traditional assumptions may indicate. This is 
however in line with previous studies of Nordic welfare states, which have indicated 
that these countries are growing further apart (Kvist, 1999: 251; Abrahamson, 1999: 
411). Interestingly though, is the large R-square observable for Denmark. This strongly 
indicates that the variables HUR and cost of unemployment, are correlated. However, 
in Sweden this strong R-square is not observable, which means that there are most 
likely some other determining variables which are not a part of the analysis. 
The UK is placed in the middle of the examined countries, while its position may not 
warrant much attention, its relative position to Belgium and France is surprising. 
Traditionally, these two countries are categorized as being a part of the conservative 
welfare regimes, yet in terms of the size of automatic stabilizers, the UK places itself 
considerably ahead.  
France bottoms out with the lowest slope, and therefore impact on the public budget, at 
0,41. France is closely followed by Italy at 0,49. These two countries also have the lowest 
R-squares of all the countries. This again may indicate that there are other variables, 
beside what we examine, that influence the public deficit. This result is quite 
unexpected for France, in particular, as they are described as having an extensive and 
centralized public sector (Owen, 2000: 65; Peters, 2010: 132).  
Austria and the Netherlands have among the highest slopes showing strong relations 
between unemployment and public budget deficits. This could be an indication that 
these two countries are perhaps to be considered within the social democratic welfare 
regime. Especially pertinent to Austria, the label of a social democratic regime is not a 
traditional viewpoint of their welfare system.  
The rest of the countries are placed somewhere in middle. They all hover around the 
0,65 slope, which is the average for all the observations. These are: Italy, Belgium, 
Sweden, UK and Ireland. Liberal welfare regimes are commonly associated with low 
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benefit levels, yet surprisingly the countries in the sample associated with that model, 
the UK and Ireland, fall in the middle of the spectrum, and not at the bottom. 
 
5.1.3 Preliminary Conclusion 
The most relevant results to assess in this subchapter are the size of the slopes. The R-
square is interesting to observe, with some reservations, as it shows us differing degree 
of explanatory power between unemployment and the cost of unemployment. The 
intersect is only of hypothetical use, as it shows the improvement of the public budget 
given zero unemployment, a highly improbable scenario. In this context, the significance 
level is a precondition for the country to be included in these results at all. 
The positions of the countries and the sizes of the automatic stabilizers highlight some 
surprises. France has the lowest impact on the public budget, whereas Denmark tops 
the chart with a near 1:1 ratio. Interestingly, Sweden is in the middle of the pack 
distancing quite considerably away from Denmark. The assumed liberal countries, UK 
and Ireland, are placed in the middle of the pack. France and Italy, which are 
traditionally considered conservative countries, are in the lower bracket in terms of 
their automatic stabilizers, this is somewhat surprising especially in comparison with 
the UK and Ireland. 
 
5.2 Decommodification 
In this section we will first consider what theory tells us about the relationship between 
automatic stabilizers, welfare states and decommodification. We will then proceed to 
present and reflect upon our results in order to answer part of the following research 
question, focusing on the shape of the automatic stabilizers.  
 
RQ2:  What are the theoretical relations between inequality (disposable income) and the 
shape of the automatic stabilizers across different welfare regimes - can they be detected 
in reality? 
 
5.2.1 Automatic Stabilizers, Replacement Rate and Welfare Regimes 
By definition, automatic stabilizers increase decommodification. This is because the 
main part of the automatic stabilizers consists of unemployment benefits and social 
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assistance. Unemployment and social assistance ensures that people who do not have a 
job, still have an income, thus decommodifying them.  
The replacement rate is directly related to both the concept of automatic stabilizers and 
to the concept of decommodification. The replacement rate shows how much of a 
worker’s wage will be replaced, by either unemployment benefits or social assistance, if 
the worker is laid off. This has an impact on the size of the automatic stabilizers. If a 
worker who is laid off gets a low replacement rate, her disposable income will fall. In 
turn, the worker’s demand for other people’s goods and services will also fall, causing 
more unemployment. The replacement rate is also the most important aspect when it 
comes to decommodification as it carries twice the weight of the other variables. The 
higher the replacement rate, higher the degree of decommodification, most likely.  
Social democratic welfare regimes have, according to Esping-Andersen, the highest 
degree of decommodification as it has universal programs. At the other end of the 
decommodification spectrum, we find the liberal welfare state. Within this regime, 
transfers are means-tested and their main focus is to combat poverty. In the middle of 
the spectrum the conservative welfare state can be found. Here rights are connected 
with type of employment and which kind of benefits are derived from that. 
 
5.2.2 Decommodification Scoring Tool 
As described in the analytical strategy, we have worked out a system to score countries 
by, based on Esping-Andersen’s method. We have looked at how many weeks of work it 
requires to be eligible for unemployment benefits, for how many weeks you can receive 
the benefits, the replacement rate of the benefits and how many days you have to wait 
in order to get benefits.  
 
Indicator Mean SD SD - 1 (range start) SD + 1 (range end) 
Weeks of work 39,8 14,2 37,9 66,4 
Duration of benefits 55,2 32,5 22,6 87,7 
Replacement rate 0,6 0,1 0,5 0,7 
Waiting days 9,1 11,5 -2,4 20,6 
TABLE 3 DECOMMODIFICATION SCORING TOOL 
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We used Table 3 to score the different degrees of decommodification in the different 
countries. We found the mean and the standard deviation of the indicators. We used 
that to work out a range, and on the basis of this range we scored the countries. For 
example, if a country requires 80 weeks of work for a worker to be eligible for benefits, 
the country will be awarded 1 point, as the country has a decommodification that is so 
low, that it is significantly different from the rest of the countries. The countries within 
the range will be awarded 2 points and countries with decommodification higher than 
the range will be awarded 3 points.   
 
5.2.3 Decommodification Results 
Table 4 shows the scores and weighted scores we awarded the countries. 
 
 Weeks 
of work 
(-IE) 
 Weeks 
duration 
(-NL) 
Waiting 
days 
Replacement 
rate 
Score Weight Weighted 
score 
Netherlands 3  3 1 6 13 0,88 11,44 
Denmark 2  3 1 6 12 0,83 9,96 
France 3  3 2 4 12 0,8 9,6 
Sweden  2  2 2 4 10 0,85 8,5 
Belgium 2  2 2 4 10 0,84 8,4 
Ireland 1  1 2 4 8 0,97 7,76 
Austria 3  2 2 4 11 0,66 7,26 
UK 2  2 2 2 8 0,82 6,56 
Italy 2  2 2 4 10 0,5 5 
TABLE 4 DECOMMODIFICATION RESULTS 
 
The Netherlands have both the highest score and the highest weighted score. This is 
because they scored above range in decommodification in weeks of work required to 
obtain rights to the benefits, in how many weeks you can receive the benefits, and in 
the generosity of the replacement rate. The Netherlands was under range in terms of 
how many days a jobseeker has to wait to get benefits.  
Denmark came in second, considerably below the Netherlands in the weighted score and 
a tied second with France for non-weighted. Denmark scored above range in terms of 
how many weeks jobseekers can receive benefits and in terms of the size of the 
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replacement rate. Denmark scored within the range in weeks of work required and 
below the range in how many days you have to wait for benefits.  
France is placed third, slightly below Denmark in the weighted score and is tied with 
Denmark for second in the non-weighted score. France is above the range in both weeks 
of work required and in the duration of the benefits. France is within the range in both 
replacement rate and waiting days. 
Sweden comes in fourth in the weighted and fifth in the non-weighted score. Sweden is 
within the range in all the indicators. 
Austria comes in seventh in the weighted score and fourth in the non-weighted score. 
Austria is above the range in weeks of work required and is within the range in the rest 
of the indicators.  
Belgium ranks fifth in the weighted score and a shared fifth place in the non-weighted 
score. Belgium is within the range on all indicators. 
Ireland places sixth in the weighted score and as a shared sixth in the non-weighted 
score. Ireland is below the range in weeks of work required and the duration of benefits. 
Ireland is within the range in terms of waiting days and the replacement rate.  
Italy is last in the weighted scores and shares fifth in the non-weighted score. Italy is 
within range for all indicators. 
The UK comes in eighth in the weighted score and in a shared fifth place in the non-
weighted score. The UK is within the range in all indicators except the replacement 
rate, here the UK is below the range.  
 
5.2.4 Weight Power 
As described in the analytic strategy, we weighted the score by the percentage of 
workers who were eligible for unemployment benefits in 2000. The influence of the 
weight can be seen in Figure 3.  
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FIGURE 3 DECOMMODIFICATION INDICES 
 
The weight affects Italy’s score the most. Italy has an overall non-weighted score of 10, 
but after it has been weighted, Italy falls behind both Ireland and the UK whose non-
weighted scores are below Italy’s. Since there are more people that are eligible to receive 
benefits in Ireland and the UK, they leapfrog Italy. This tells us, that once you are 
receiving benefits in Italy, you are more decommodified than you would have been in 
Ireland or the UK, but it is more difficult to become eligible for the benefits. 
The story is similar for Austria. Austria’s non-weighted score is above both Sweden and 
Belgium, but because more people are eligible for benefits in these countries, Austria is 
left behind. As in the case of Italy, jobseekers eligible for benefits are more 
decommodified in Austria than in Sweden and Belgium.  
In the top end of the scale, the weighting means that Denmark gets ahead of France in 
the weighted score, because more people are eligible for the benefits in Denmark 
compared to France. 
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5.2.5 Preliminary Conclusion 
We have scored the degree of decommodification in different European countries and 
found that the Netherlands are decommodified to the largest extent followed by 
Denmark and France. Sweden and Belgium are in found in the higher part of the 
middle, while Ireland and Austria are found in the lower middle. The countries with the 
lowest degree of decommodification are the UK and Italy. We have also seen that the 
percentage of workers that have access to the benefits are very important for the 
weighted scores. The weighted score can be used to give an overall picture of the degree 
decommodification in the country, while the non-weighted scores can be used to compare 
to what extent jobseekers are being decommodified once they are eligible for benefits.   
 
5.3 Stratification 
This section will answer the part of research question two pertaining to inequality. We 
will present the stratification results, showing the relationship between social transfers 
and inequality. First, we will briefly reiterate central concepts and then we will proceed 
to present the results. 
 
5.3.1 Automatic Stabilizers, Stratification and Welfare Regimes 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, automatic stabilizers assume different shapes 
and sizes across welfare regimes, having differentiated impacts on inequality. Under 
social democratic welfare regimes, automatic stabilizers should be the largest, and most 
effective at reducing stratification as they are specially targeted at reducing class 
inequality. Within liberal welfare regimes, automatic stabilizers should be minimal and 
targeted towards low income households, while having a moderate effect on reducing 
inequality due to their means-tested system. In conservative welfare regimes, automatic 
stabilizers should be moderate, but their impact on stratification should be lowest as 
they are based upon class distinctions and lack redistributive abilities. 
When presenting our empirical data, the theory seems to hold up in some cases based 
on these common sense assumptions of which countries belong to which welfare regime, 
but there are also some unexpected results.  
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5.3.2 Exploring and Ranking Stratification 
Looking first upon the average relative change in Gini due to transfers over the time 
period 2005-2013 as shown in Figure 4, there is a clear difference between the 
investigated countries. Three distinct groups emerge, with one outlier. Denmark and 
Ireland stand out at the top of the pack, with social transfers (minus pensions) having 
average relative impacts on Gini at 22,7 and 26,5 percent respectively, making Ireland 
an unexpected leader. Next, the UK, Sweden, and Belgium form a second-tier ranging 
from 16,2 to 17,3 percent. Surprisingly, Sweden is over 5 percentage points behind their 
Nordic neighbor, Denmark, despite the fact that they have an elaborate welfare system 
targeted at having redistributive purposes (Chandler, 2000: 162). The third tier, which 
becomes evident contains France, Austria and Netherlands, who range from 12,4 to 13,7 
percent. Finally, the result for Italy lies far outside the other investigated countries at 
3,8 percent, indicating that their social transfers have little effect in reducing 
inequality. 
 
 
FIGURE 4 RELATIVE CHANGE IN GINI DUE TO TRANSFERS 
 
Page 42 of 67 
 
Examining the development of Gini and the role of transfers over the time period 2005-
2013 brings further insights. Although the three clusterings between countries, as 
outlined above, appear once again in Figure 5, it is interesting to notice both the 
differences in the shape of the automatic stabilizers that occur over time, and also in 
relation to the influence of pension systems in reducing stratification. 
Denmark and Ireland both had notable increases in the influence of transfers on Gini, 
evidenced by sharp spikes in both countries in 2009. However, while Denmark seemed 
to normalize already in 2010, Ireland’s level of Gini reduction from transfers proceeded 
to increase. This could be indicative of a policy change taking place within the 
administration of Irish social transfers, increasing the redistributive quality of their 
welfare system. This is aligned with the notion that Ireland has been changing its public 
administrative systems, increasingly moving away from the UK as a role model (Collins 
& O’Shea, 2000: 123), perhaps learning from other regimes in a process of globalization 
(Chandler, 2000: 263). Another possible explanation is that interest groups representing 
receivers of social benefits have become more vocal in pressuring policymakers (Peters, 
2010: 279).     
 
FIGURE 5 ABSOLUTE REDUCTION IN GINI DUE TO SOCIAL TRANSFERS 
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While the impact of social transfers on Gini has changed much less dramatically in the 
other countries, there are still some interesting trends. The impacts of transfers on Gini 
in Sweden and Belgium have trended downwards over the period, while the opposite 
has been the case in the UK and Italy. The figure above highlights the comparative 
changes amongst the countries in terms of increases/decreases in relative Gini due to 
social transfers. 
Although pensions are not a part of automatic stabilizers, as discussed in the 
methodology, it is interesting to consider their role in relation to the other social 
transfers included, as shown in Figure 6. In Italy, France, Austria and Netherlands, 
pensions play a larger role than other social transfers in reducing inequality. In the UK, 
Belgium and Denmark, there is a closer balance between the two, although there is a 
shift after the crisis in Denmark and UK, where pensions appear to be contributing 
more than other social transfers. While Sweden fits into this category prior to the crisis, 
there is a clear and sustained increase in the influence of pensions on Gini after the 
crisis, where Denmark exhibits a similar spike which drops off the next year. Ireland is 
once again a unique case, being the only country where transfers play a larger role than 
pensions, which only continues to increase throughout the time period.  
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FIGURE 6 IMPACT ON GINI CHANGE OVER TIME 
 
5.3.3 Stratification Results 
Utilizing a simplified version of the scoring system, used to create the 
decommodification index earlier, countries were once again given a ranking, this time 
in terms of stratification. However, only one indicator was used here, i.e. average 
relative change of Gini due to social transfers from 2005-2013 (without pensions), 
making the scoring less nuanced than the decommodification index. Nevertheless, it 
allowed for a ranking of the countries based on country placement in relation to the 
standard deviation. Due to Italy’s outlying score it was excluded from the initial 
calculations of the standard deviation. Table 5 shows the mean, standard deviation, and 
ranges above and below the standard deviation of the mean. Meaning, countries with 
an average relative change of Gini due to social transfers below 12,6% received 
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stratification scores of 1, countries above 22,3% received scores of 3, and those in 
between received scores of 2. It is imperative to note that a high stratification score does 
not indicate that there is a high level of inequality within a given country, but rather 
that the welfare system in place has a high impact on lowering stratification. 
 
Indicator Mean SD SD - 1 (range start) SD + 1 (range end) 
Impact of social transfers 
(minus pensions) on Gini 
17,5 4,9 12,6 22,3 
TABLE 5 STRATIFICATION SCORING TOOL 
 
Table 6 shows the stratification scoring of the investigated countries. While Ireland and 
Denmark are still in the top positions, there has been a shift in the other groupings. 
Rather than two other distinct groups, France has fallen into the bottom with Italy, 
causing Austria and Netherlands to cluster together with the UK, Sweden and Belgium, 
although they are closer to France in terms of percentage points. Seemingly, the 
stratification score provides a less nuanced picture than looking at the individual 
countries over time. But based on these rankings, some idea of how the countries fit into 
welfare regimes, at least in terms of stratification, can be teased out. Ireland is the 
biggest surprise, having a higher relative Gini change than the two Nordic countries 
although it is often described as fitting within the liberal regime. 
 
Countries Stratification score 
Italy 1 
France 1 
Austria 2 
Netherlands 2 
United Kingdom 2 
Sweden 2 
Belgium 2 
Denmark 3 
Ireland 3 
TABLE 6 STRATIFICATION SCORES 
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5.3.4 Preliminary Conclusion 
We investigated the impact of automatic stabilizers on inequality by measuring the 
relative change in Gini induced by social transfers, not including pensions. Based on 
these values, each country was given a stratification score. Ireland and Denmark scored 
highest (3), Austria, Netherlands, UK, Sweden, and Belgium were in the middle (2), and 
Italy and France received the lowest scores (1). High scores indicate that social transfers 
minus pensions play a larger role in reducing inequality compared to lower scores. 
Based on the theory, countries scoring (3) fit within the social democratic regime, (2) 
within the liberal regime, and (1) within the conservative regime, at least in terms of 
stratification. However, the stratification scores hide some of the nuance that was 
evident in the data, such as the changes within individual countries over time. 
Nevertheless, stratification scores will be used as an aspect of evaluating how the 
different countries fit within welfare regimes within the discussion.  
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“Typologizing ... is the lowest form of intellectual endeavor” 
 -Peter Baldwin 
6.0 Discussion 
This chapter aims at discussing the results found in the previous chapter. First, we will 
discuss the placement of the countries within different welfare regimes based on the 
results from stratification and decommodification. These placements will then be held 
up against the size of the automatic stabilizers, and the impact on Gini. Then we will 
discuss the empirical findings versus the macroeconomic theoretical considerations. 
Finally, the last chapter is a comprehensive discussion on noise that became apparent 
throughout the analysis. Here we present all the relevant issues and concerns relating 
to indicators, methods and theory that were not negated in the methodological 
framework, which could have impacted the validity of the results. 
 
6.1 Welfare Regimes 
This section will present our grouping of countries into the three main welfare regimes 
covered in the theoretical chapter, based on their stratification and decommodification 
scores. In doing so, we will apply the findings presented in the Results chapter and 
discuss why and how our empirical data suggests where the countries should be placed, 
in order to explore the following research question: 
 
RQ3: How do the theoretical assumptions from different welfare regimes fare when 
compared to the empirical data? 
 
Table 7 consolidates the categorization of countries into welfare regimes.  
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 Stratification score Decommodification score Welfare Regime 
Austria 2 7,26 L 
Belgium 2 8,4 C 
Denmark 3 9,96 SD 
France 1 9,6 C 
Ireland 3 7,76 L 
Italy 1 5 L 
Netherlands 2 11,44 SD 
Sweden 2 8,5 C 
UK 2 6,56 L 
TABLE 7 CATEGORIZATION OF WELFARE REGIMES 
 
6.1.1 Social Democratic Welfare Regimes 
Theoretically, countries fitting the social democratic welfare regime ideal type should 
have both high stratification and decommodification scores. Denmark fits very well 
within this conceptualization, as they scored highly in both indices. Their social 
transfers are the second most effective in reducing stratification, and their 
unemployment benefits provide the second highest levels of decommodification.  
However, no other countries fit quite so cleanly within this category. Although France 
has the third highest decommodification score, they are on the lowest end of the 
stratification score, eliminating them from this welfare regime. Additionally, while 
Ireland scores highly in stratification they score the fourth lowest at providing 
decommodification, disqualifying them as well. The Netherlands have the highest 
decommodification score, but rank in the middle in terms of stratification. As a result 
of their considerable lead in decommodification, we have chosen to assign them to the 
social democratic welfare regime. But the fit is not as clear cut as in the Danish case.  
 
6.1.2 Liberal Welfare Regimes 
Countries within the liberal welfare regime should theoretically score low in 
decommodification and in the middle in terms of stratification.  
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The UK and Austria seem to fit well within this regime as they have the second and 
third lowest decommodification scores, respectively, combined with a medium 
stratification score. Sweden and Belgium score very closely to one another, having a 
medium-high decommodification score, which indicates that they should not be put in 
this category despite their medium stratification levels. 
As Ireland did not qualify for the social democratic regime due to their low 
decommodification score, they seem to fit best within the liberal welfare regime. 
However, their high level of stratification complicates this categorization. Similarly, 
Italy has the lowest decommodification score of the group, making it a candidate for 
placement within the liberal regime, but it also scores lowest in terms of stratification. 
It seems that Ireland is within a social-liberal regime, while Italy is closer to a 
conservative-liberal regime. 
 
6.1.3 Conservative Welfare Regime 
Finally, countries fitting the conservative welfare regime ideal type should theoretically 
have a combination of low stratification and medium decommodification levels. 
France seems to fit well within this category, with its low stratification scoring paired 
with a quite high level of decommodification. Additionally, as Sweden and Belgium had 
decommodification scores on the medium-high end, it seems they are better placed 
within the conservative than the liberal regime. However, this is by no means a good 
fit. Especially when looking deeper at the measurement of social transfers’ impact on 
Gini lying behind the stratification scoring. Here it is clear, that these two countries lie 
at the medium-high end of the scale here as well, making their stratification placement 
in the middle not completely accurate. As they score medium-high on both indicators, 
perhaps they would be better described as ‘weak’ social democratic regimes, according 
to these results.  
 
6.2 Inequality Across Welfare Regimes 
We tried to see if there were any correlations between inequality and the size of 
automatic stabilizers, but we did not find any significant relationships. Figure 7 shows 
the relative change in Gini-coefficient due to transfers, against automatic stabilizers. 
This means that what we can observe is the cost of reducing inequality. The relation 
between the countries is not statistically significant, we can observe that it is not the 
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same cost of reducing inequality between the countries, this indicates that the countries 
are indeed quite different. 
 
 
FIGURE 7 AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS AND INEQUALITY 
 
Within the countries we classified as belonging to the liberal welfare regime, Ireland 
has the highest relative reduction in Gini and yet does not have quite so large automatic 
stabilizers. This indicates that Ireland is quite efficient at decreasing inequality through 
their social benefits. UK is placed in the middle of the illustration, showing medium cost 
at reducing relative inequality. Austria, with their slightly larger automatic stabilizers, 
has comparatively lower reduction in inequality than UK. Finally, Italy is an outlier 
within this regime, and thus excluded from the liberal regime’s visual representation in 
Figure 7, for the sake of clarity. It has by far the lowest reduction in inequality as well 
as the second smallest automatic stabilizers. 
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Within the conservative regime, Sweden is placed in the middle of the diagram, showing 
medium cost at reducing relative inequality. But compared to other conservative regime 
countries, it is placed in the top on both the size of the automatic stabilizers as well as 
in relative reduction in inequality. Belgium is similar to Sweden at the same level of 
reduction in inequality but the size of the automatic stabilizers differs considerably. 
This suggests that Belgium is more efficient at reducing inequality than Sweden. France 
has the lowest overall automatic stabilizers amongst all the countries, and lowest 
inequality reduction within the regime. However, since the French Gini reduction is on 
par with the rest, albeit lower, it is quite likely there are some other variables playing 
a role in reducing inequality. 
Lastly, the social democratic regime is placed to the upper right on the illustration 
meaning that these two countries, Denmark and the Netherlands, have large automatic 
stabilizers but only Denmark has a large reduction in inequality. Denmark has the 
highest automatic stabilizers and second highest Gini reduction overall. The 
Netherlands have the second highest automatic stabilizers and are placed in the middle 
in terms of Gini reduction. 
If we look at the welfare regimes it becomes evident that there are some relatively 
distinct clusterings of countries, with the exception of Sweden and Italy. Sweden is 
placed in between the liberal and the conservative regimes. Italy is far removed from 
any other of the regimes. 
The conservative regime displays quite large variation in the size of the automatic 
stabilizers. In this context, the Gini reduction in the conservative regime is quite equal 
within the regime. Similarly, the social democratic regime displays a wide gap in the 
size of the automatic stabilizers and a bigger divide between relative Gini reductions. 
Within the liberal regime, there is a tighter grouping of countries (not including Italy) 
in terms of the size of the automatic stabilizers than the other two regimes. However, 
the spread of their automatic stabilizers in terms of reducing inequality is larger, with 
Ireland lying far above the other two countries in this regime. Additionally, the UK is 
located within the overlapping section between the conservation and liberal regimes, 
indicating that our classification could be up for debate. 
We cannot find a statistical relation between the size of the automatic stabilizers and 
relative Gini reduction. However, we can see that the different welfare regimes are 
portrayed quite distinctively on the illustration above. 
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Another trend which goes against our theoretical assumptions about the size of 
automatic stabilizers across welfare regimes, is that we assume conservative welfare 
states would have medium size automatic stabilizers and liberal the smallest. However, 
here we see that the liberal regime is placed in the middle, between the social democratic 
and the conservative with the exception of Italy. The reason for this skewed position of 
the conservative welfare regimes is quite likely a result of differing unemployment 
benefits systems, where many of the conservative regimes tend to favor private 
financing. This fits well with the classical ideal type conservative regime, and since this 
is a private part of the welfare system, these numbers are not a part of the automatic 
stabilizers calculations (Cleiss, 2014). 
If we consider the placement of the countries in relation to the Post-Keynesian 
assumption that there is a relationship between the size of the automatic stabilizers 
and inequality we find that this is the case to some degree. We can see that Denmark 
has large automatic stabilizers and a relatively large Gini reduction due to social 
transfers. Similarly the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and the UK have medium sized 
automatic stabilizers and a medium Gini reduction. Italy also follows this trend, 
exhibiting low automatic stabilizers and a small Gini reduction. France, Ireland and 
Belgium, does not follow this trend. France has the smallest automatic stabilizers, but 
achieves a medium Gini reduction. Ireland deviates greatly from the Post-Keynesian 
assumption. They produce the highest Gini reduction with a medium sized automatic 
stabilizer. However as institutions matter a great deal within the Post-Keynesian 
theory, this phenomenon could be explained by institutional change. Ireland has from 
2004 to 2011 increased its unemployment benefit levels and amount of non means-
tested transfers (Watson & Maître, 2013: x-xi). Belgium also deviates from the trend. 
They demonstrate the third largest Gini reduction while having the third smallest 
automatic stabilizers.  
 
6.3 Macroeconomic Discussion 
This section aims to compare the theoretical economic assumptions about the world and 
compare with the real world, i.e. our empirical data. We will discuss if there any 
deviations from the theories and which theories find support in our evidence. 
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6.3.1 Differences within Welfare Regimes 
By looking at empirical data contrary to our theory, we can explore the differences 
within each of the welfare regimes, and how they work. Is there a difference in efficiency 
among similar countries? We can see that UK and Ireland fare quite differently when it 
comes to reducing inequality, even though they both have means-tested systems. At the 
same time we can see that Denmark and Sweden also fare quite different even though 
they both commonly assumed to be universal social democratic systems. This suggests 
that when reducing inequality it is not so much the system that matters, but how it is 
administered. 
 
6.3.2 Cost of Unemployment  
The results show some interesting aspects in terms of unemployment, which are 
relevant to discuss in the context of the two main economic paradigms: Post-
Keynesianism and Neoclassicism. This subchapter will discuss the findings in this 
project and relate to the two main theories and see, which one comes out on top, if any. 
To reiterate briefly, Neoclassicists expect that unemployment is higher in countries with 
higher replacement rates, this is because of less incentives to work. In this connection 
the wage, labor supply and labor demand form an equilibrium and determine 
unemployment levels. On the other side of the fence, Post-Keynesians view 
unemployment to be connected with demand. This means that even though wages are 
low and there is high unemployment, there will not be any considerable fall in 
unemployment till there is higher demand. Higher decommodification means, boiled 
down, to be able to meet fundamental needs despite not being a part of the labor market. 
This means that in case of being unemployed, the worker is able to purchase goods, 
which in a Post-Keynesian optic is to ensure aggregate demand. 
Figure 8 shows decommodification weighted score pitted against average 
unemployment rates (1997 - 2014). Although these results are by no means conclusive, 
there are some interesting points to highlight.  
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FIGURE 8 UNEMPLOYMENT AND DECOMMODIFICATION 
 
The two countries with the highest decommodification scores and the 2nd and 3rd lowest 
unemployment rates, which we have in the above section labelled as social democratic 
welfare regimes, are Denmark and the Netherlands. This evidence seems to go against 
the Neoclassical notion that higher replacement rates will defer people from getting 
employment. Conversely, it supports a Post-Keynesian explanation in which higher 
demand is connected with higher levels of decommodification. Since Post-Keynesians 
view demand as the determinant for unemployment, these two empirical observations 
seem to provide evidence for this theoretical viewpoint. Yet, it is difficult to conclude on 
this aspect since we do not use any wage indicators which is the main determinant 
according to Neoclassicals. 
Two observations that seem to fall into a Neoclassicist explanation are the UK and 
Austria. With low replacement rates and low unemployment, these two liberal welfare 
regimes could be understood to strengthen the Neoclassicist argument. Lower levels of 
decommodification should, according to Post-Keynesians, be consistent with higher 
levels of unemployment, but these two cases quite clearly go against this notion. 
However, in this respect Italy and to a lesser extent Ireland are outliers which we have 
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also assigned to the liberal welfare regime, indicating that the empirical evidence 
clearly does not show a straightforward picture. It is imperative to keep in mind that 
caution must be exercised, since we do not measure demand of labor nor do we 
investigate wage levels, these results are only to be considered as indications and objects 
of discussions. 
A more difficult point to explain are the conservative welfare regimes, these are 
especially France, but to some extent can also cover Sweden and Belgium. France has a 
high level of decommodification and high unemployment, therefore this observation 
supports a Neoclassical viewpoint in which unemployment is not guided by demand, but 
by wage levels and labor supply. Slightly different and perhaps more difficult to make 
tentative conclusions on, is the case of Belgium and Sweden. These countries are quite 
narrowly grouped, as evident in Figure 8. The observations give neither theoretical 
framework solid support, rather both seem to offer plausible explanations. Post-
Keynesians would expect higher unemployment levels due to lower levels of 
decommodification in comparison to the social democratic welfare regimes. Contrarily, 
Neoclassicists would expect higher unemployment as a result of higher 
decommodification levels. 
The differences between the countries suggests that there is something else in play than 
rational choices and effective demand. As mentioned in the theory chapter, institutions 
play an important role in both the theoretical viewpoints. If an institution, such as the 
labor market, is guided by fiscal and monetary policies under one particular economic 
theory, it is plausible that the labor market institutions will adapt to that environment.   
 
6.3.3 Preliminary Conclusion 
Although there is not enough data to make any concrete conclusions on the above 
discussion, what seems quite evident is that the placement of some countries can 
support a Post-Keynesian perspective, especially Denmark and the Netherlands, 
whereas others offer little support, mostly UK, France and Austria. The same is valid 
for the Neoclassical perspective, it offers support for the UK and France, perhaps also 
Austria yet struggles with the remaining observations, especially the Netherlands and 
Denmark. 
It is quite imperative to note that the parameters which are typically important in terms 
of unemployment in the Neoclassical viewpoint (wage, labor supply, etc.) are not used 
directly. Rather this is an indirect discussion of the results found in this project. The 
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same is true for the Post-Keynesian viewpoint, which views demand as determinant for 
unemployment. Since this discussion somewhat equates decommodification with 
demand, at least that it has an influence, it is not completely solid ground for obtaining 
evidence. This does mean that there are certain implications regarding what we can 
find in terms of unemployment levels and welfare regimes, yet some patterns are 
detectable that at least give indications to which theoretical paradigms can be applied. 
 
6.4 Noise 
There are several interesting critical reflections to be had on the basis of our analysis, 
in this section we wish to highlight some of the issues prevalent in the project which 
might influence the results. These are limitations which emerged during the research 
process, and therefore the discussion on these issues are present in this chapter and not 
the methods chapter.  
 
6.4.1 Gini and Taxation 
One important concern, as mentioned in the section on methods, is that we have not 
isolated the impact of taxes on inequality. This means that, we do not know what impact 
the tax system has when it comes to reducing Gini. There could be some important 
differences between the countries, that we have missed because we do not have this 
aspect in our analysis. However, this was necessary due to the fact that the OECD 
database only had Gini data for disposable income, not the market income. 
Furthermore, the focus on transfers alone was justified by Esping-Andersen’s theory. 
Another issue with the Gini calculations, is that we have not managed to eliminate 
sickness and housing benefits from the data on social transfers. This was a limitation 
of the Eurostat data which could not be overcome, meaning that these variables cloud 
our results to some extent. While sickness benefits play a role within 
decommodification, they are not relevant for automatic stabilizers. Similarly, housing 
benefits could reduce stratification, but again, they are not triggered by up- or 
downturns in the economy. This could have impacted our stratification calculations, 
depending on the relative level of these benefits across countries. However, it could on 
the other hand be argued that these benefits could have a stabilizing effect in an 
economic downturn. If housing benefit recipients become unemployed, and the benefits 
are high, their disposable income will not take as drastic a hit compared to if they 
Page 57 of 67 
 
received no benefit. Furthermore, if housing benefits are income-based, unemployed 
persons may be eligible to receive housing benefits alongside their unemployment 
benefits.  
It is imperative to keep in mind that the Gini-coefficients used in this project are 
calculated as the relative change in Gini over time in order to reflect as much as possible 
the effect of automatic stabilizers. However, this has some implications. The 
predominant concern is that the countries with low overall Gini-coefficients (after all 
transfers) are likely to have smaller Gini reductions over time. This means that the 
stratification scores could be skewed in favor of countries with higher overall Gini-
coefficients, since we do not take the overall starting point in Gini into account. This is 
a potential concern, but a necessary step in order to ensure that we can isolate automatic 
stabilizers and their effect on Gini. The lowest observed Gini-coefficients are to be found 
in Scandinavia during the 70’s and 80’s, these were at 0.19 (Piketty, 2014: 266). This 
means that overall Gini-coefficients in the vicinity of these numbers are practically the 
maximum equality. Therefore countries such as Sweden, who are approaching this 
level, may have greater difficulty at reducing Gini further, in this case paradigm change, 
rather than incremental policy adjustments, may be necessary. 
There are also practical issues in terms of not only differing taxation schemes, but also 
the capacity to collect them. Italy has proven extremely proliferate at passing laws, 
outnumbering in order of magnitude France and Germany, but with regards to 
upholding these laws the experience is far worse. Aside from the ineffective control 
mechanisms, there is also vast amount of tax evasion, so not only has Italy trouble 
collecting taxes, but Italians are also quite unwilling to pay them (Spence, 2000: 126-
130). 
 
6.4.2 Decommodification Issues 
We are slightly critical towards two aspects of Esping-Andersen’s method for scoring 
decommodification. One is that the computation method puts relatively high emphasis 
on relative population coverage, due to the fact that it is used as a weight for the 
decommodification score. For instance, this has a huge impact on Italy. Although, we do 
agree that it is a very important parameter, the weighting used in this project might be 
slightly misleading. This is because we weighted the different countries’ 
decommodification scores with the percentage of relevant population who had access to 
the benefits. As there were no current numbers available we had to use data from 2000 
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(Scruggs & Allan, 2003). This means that we in our weighting have missed 15 years of 
reform.  
A second aspect that can create noise is the choice of including how many days you have 
to wait in order to get unemployment benefits in the decommodification calculation. 
Waiting days seem to differ slightly across the data, yet we are not in agreement with 
Esping-Andersen as to whether this parameter is of much real importance for workers 
who are being decommodified. In a European context, you have to wait until you get any 
unemployment benefits, but as a rule of thumb you still get paid from the day you lost 
your job. Thus, there is a slight lag, or delay in payments and we question how much 
influence this parameter has on decommodification in reality. It does not seem 
reasonable that the difference between waiting one day, seven days, or up to a month 
counts as much as the difference of being able to receive the benefits for 22 weeks or 162 
weeks. Our conclusion is that, the duration of benefits indicator should be weighted 
more than waiting days in future decommodification studies. 
 
6.4.3 Issues of Operationalizing Esping-Andersen’s Theory  
Based on findings in the literature review, Esping-Andersen’s theory was adapted to fit 
the context of the project. As a result, several portions of Esping-Andersen’s 
methodology were removed due to their lack of relevance. In regards to 
decommodification, the method held up relatively well, as all indicators could be covered 
for this specific concept. But this was not as clear cut for stratification. Esping-
Andersen’s original conceptualization is much more multifaceted than what was applied 
in this project, but it has so many aspects that are not relevant for automatic stabilizers 
that our version ended up looking completely different. By looking only at income 
distribution, the social aspect of stratification becomes lost. For example in the UK, 
which is often seen as highly class divided and class conscious (Kingdom, 2000: 17). 
It can thus be questioned whether we have actually operationalized stratification in a 
manner which fits the theory, meaning that our categorizations of countries within 
welfare regimes could be quite off. Furthermore, our operationalization of 
decommodification only looked at unemployment benefits, not other aspects such as 
pensions. This means that our results do not provide a complete picture of a country's 
welfare regime typology, but rather only that which pertains to automatic stabilizers. 
As shown in the stratification results section, pensions play a considerably large 
redistributive role in Italy. Furthermore, the Italian pension system could be seen as 
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having a large capacity for decommodification, as it at one time granted 70-80% 
replacement rates without any history of contributions (Spence, 2000: 140). If the focus 
of this project had been less narrow and included pensions, Italy may have been 
categorized quite differently. 
 
6.4.4 Delimitation and Choice of Countries 
There are some critical reflections to be had concerning the approach in delimiting the 
amount of countries. This is especially pertinent to the first part of the analysis where 
we look at the cost of unemployment and harmonized unemployment rate, which also 
inadvertently impacts the decommodification and stratification results. The regression 
analysis for the entire sample size was delimited on the basis of a significance test. This 
was guided by the assumption that most countries would exhibit a relation between the 
cost of unemployment and unemployment rates, however this may have been a critical 
oversight as countries with weak or no automatic stabilizers could potentially not 
exhibit this correlation. This means to some extent that the significance test is not only 
a statistical test, but also a test that indicates whether the countries in the sample 
actually have a large enough welfare state for it to be detectable in our parameters. In 
hindsight, it could have been interesting to have included the ‘insignificant’ countries 
for the stratification and decommodification analysis. 
When testing if countries have significant differences in terms of decommodification the 
test is highly dependent on which countries are included in the test, as it will affect the 
standard deviation. This means that our results are affected by the fact that we ‘only’ 
investigate 9 countries. The standard deviation would have been different if all 28 EU 
countries were included. Hence, some of the countries included in our analysis might 
have scored differently if all 28 EU countries were included. The selection of countries 
based on the significance test could also have distorted the assignment of countries to 
different welfare regimes. A country’s adherence to a specific welfare regime in this 
project is determined based on their decommodification and stratification scores, 
relative to other countries. The fact that many countries are missing from the picture, 
means that the assigned welfare regimes for the countries could be misleading for the 
conclusions drawn in this project. This could account for the considerable deviation of 
some countries from our expectations, such as Sweden’s categorization as a conservative 
country. 
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6.4.5 Comparing ‘Apple and Oranges’ 
Another source of noise when determining the decommodification of unemployment 
benefits was that the systems are so different. In some countries, the amount of weeks 
you can receive unemployment benefits for is dependent on your age. With regard to the 
replacement rate the different countries have different replacement rates for different 
family types. These differences in the design of the systems makes it difficult to compare 
them properly. The degree of decommodification might have looked different if we had 
chosen an older worker as the starting point of this analysis, rather than an average 
worker. Furthermore, much nuance is lost when boiling down complicated systems into 
one single value for the purpose of cross-country comparison. For example, Denmark 
scored poorly on the indicator for number of waiting days before payout because 
payments are issued on the first of the month. This means that waiting days could 
potentially be between 1-30 days, depending on when the unemployment person applied 
for their benefit. We gave Denmark a value of 30 days for this indicator, but this does 
not quite tell the whole story. How to properly represent these qualitative details 
becomes a challenge in this type of quantitative study.  
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“Welfare's purpose should be to eliminate, as far as possible, the 
need for its own existence.” 
 - Ronald Reagan 
7. Conclusion 
Our findings are somewhat convoluted by noise, this noise is especially pertinent to the 
theory, methodology and indicators. The theoretical concerns are related to some 
shortcomings of Esping-Andersen’s indicators, especially waiting days. Amongst the 
various methodological concerns, the most evident is the delimitation of countries. Since 
the sample size is relatively small, it also questions the comparative aspect of the 
project. This leads to the second concern, relating to the phenomena of comparing 
‘apples’ to ‘oranges’. This was chiefly visible in the widely differing types of benefits 
found in each individual country, and how each country structures and administrates 
its benefits, as well as what types of benefits are available. In terms of indicators, 
measuring inequality is not straightforward and therefore there are some limitations to 
the Gini-coefficient as an indicator. With this in mind, we will now proceed to answer 
the problem definition: 
 
To what extent did the size and shape of automatic stabilizers within different welfare 
regimes in the European Union result in differing outcomes in terms of inequality 
between and within countries? 
 
We found that the size and shape of automatic stabilizers differ considerably between 
the investigated countries, as well as impact on inequality. Denmark and the 
Netherlands showed characteristics resembling the social democratic welfare regime 
ideal type, with a high level of decommodification, and a large relative reduction in 
inequality due to social transfers. However, the Netherlands were not a perfect fit 
within the regime due to their medium level of stratification, despite the fact that they 
had the highest level of decommodification. In line with our theoretical assumptions, 
the countries within this regime had the biggest automatic stabilizers of the 
investigated countries. Notably, Denmark fits the regime best, and has by far the largest 
automatic stabilizers, overshadowing the Netherlands. However, there was a noticeable 
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discrepancy between the countries in the impact of social transfers on inequality, with 
the Netherlands placing third to last within the group. 
The UK and Austria showed characteristics of the liberal welfare regime. They had a 
low degree of decommodification, coupled with medium to low reductions in inequality 
due to social transfers. Ireland also exhibits traits of a liberal welfare state with 
medium-low decommodification scores, but had a surprisingly large reduction in 
inequality due to social transfers, which makes them difficult to place firmly within any 
regime. As in the case of Ireland, Italy is difficult to pin-down within the welfare 
regimes, because their scores are so much lower than the rest of the investigated 
countries. We have placed them within the liberal regime. This is because Italy has by 
far the lowest degree of decommodification and an almost non-existing reduction in 
inequality due to social transfers.  
There is a divide between the countries placed within the liberal regime, in terms of the 
size of their automatic stabilizers. Austria and Ireland are among the countries with 
the largest automatic stabilizers of the group, and Italy has the second lowest, giving 
no clear link between the type of welfare regime and the size of automatic stabilizers. 
The large size of the automatic stabilizers in Austria and Ireland is quite surprising, as 
theoretically they should be low within the liberal regime. In terms of the link between 
automatic stabilizers and inequality, Ireland stands out, having the largest impact on 
inequality despite modestly sized automatic stabilizers. 
France was the only country that exactly fit the conservative welfare regime typology. 
They have a high degree of decommodification and a low reduction in inequality due to 
social transfers. We have placed Sweden and Belgium in the conservative welfare 
regimes, but they display some features from the liberal welfare regime as well. They 
have a relatively large reduction in Gini due to social transfers and a medium degree of 
decommodification.  
The size of the automatic stabilizers varies within the countries we have labelled as 
conservative welfare regimes, yet the Gini-coefficient reduction is quite similar across 
the regime. France has the smallest automatic stabilizers, while they are medium-sized 
in both Sweden and Belgium.  
Within the conservative welfare regime, there is a large spread in the size of the 
automatic stabilizers, but the lowest difference in relative change in inequality. 
Conversely, within the liberal welfare regime, the spread of the automatic stabilizers is 
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the smallest yet there is the largest discrepancy between relative change in inequality. 
The differing findings within these two regimes seems to indicate that, according to the 
empirical evidence and our classifications, the size of the automatic stabilizers does not 
have a clear cut impact on inequality across the welfare regimes. 
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9.0 Appendix 
See attached documents. 
